

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIALS
1.	DCI		X		
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3.	EXDIR		X		
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9.	Chm/NIC				
10.	GC				
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12.	Compt				
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14.	D/OLL		X		
15.	D/PAO				
16.	SA/IA				
17.	AO/DCI				
18.	C/IPD/OIS				
19.	NIO/SP		X		
20.	VC/NIC		X		
21.	NIO/USSR		X		
22.	C/ACIS		X		
SUSPENSE					
23.	D/SOVA/DI				

Remarks

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Executive Secretary
20 May 85

Date

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DIA review completed.

Executive Registry

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United States Senate

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May 17, 1985

The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
 Secretary of Defense
 Department of Defense
 Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Cap:

Enclosed is a letter from DIA Director Lt. General James Williams purporting to answer my letter to you dated April 3, 1985. The purpose of my original letter to you on the number of Soviet ICBM warheads is to strengthen the case for the President's Strategic Modernization Program and for the Defense Budget. The more truth that I can release about the extent of the Soviet threat the stronger our case and the better I can support you. I am not quibbling over merely marginally important numbers, but we are trying to determine the single most significant measure of military capability -- comparative ICBM warheads. Underestimates weaken the case for strategic modernization and the Defense Budget.

General Williams' letter unfortunately raises more questions than it answers.

The fact that deployment of the mobile SS-24 and SS-25 ICBMs is impending clearly suggests, as I argued, that the Soviet ICBM warhead chart on page 30 of Soviet Military Power 1985 should rise, rather than level off. Moreover, DIA has assumed that the SS-25 will have a single warhead. But President Reagan has confirmed to Congress that the SS-25's warhead is clearly less than one half the total Throw-weight. Does this fact not clearly imply covert MIRVing of the SS-25, which the SALT II prohibition on light single warheads was intended to prevent?

I am very familiar with the overt deployment of the 4th Generation of Soviet ICBMs, and the unfavorable effect of this deployment on our estimates of Soviet ICBM warheads. The Soviet SS-19 deployment clearly defeated the object and purpose of SALT I. But you must acknowledge several deficiencies in these ICBM estimates.

First, U.S. estimates of Soviet ICBM production are not derived from direct evidence, but are instead reportedly inferred from

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evidence of Soviet ICBM modernization and replacements. Therefore, the U.S. has no firm estimates of Soviet ICBM production.

Second, the U.S. has an imperfect understanding of Soviet covert ICBM deployment techniques. For example, it took the U.S. from 1976 to 1984, 8 years, to finally conclude that the Soviet mobile SS-16 ICBM was deployed and camouflaged and concealed in violation of SALT I and II.

In view of inadequate U.S. understanding of Soviet ICBM production and covert deployments, DIA's estimates of Soviet ICBM launchers and warheads must be regarded as minimal estimates. Moreover, DIA's estimates take no account of reload/refire missiles, covert MIRVing, excess MIRVing of the SS-18 beyond SALT II limits, stockpiled ICBMs for covert soft launch, and test and training and reserve ICBM launchers.

General Williams states that "the ten-warhead SS-X-24 is expected to be deployed in late 1985 ... and will probably replace SS-17 ICBMs on a one for one basis." This is a puzzling assertion.

First, how do you expect to know how many SS-24s are deployed at all, since you do not know their production rate, they are heavily camouflaged and concealed in testing and deployment, and you can not reportedly monitor them adequately?

Moreover, if the Soviet SS-7/8 ICBM force were doubly replaced by modern SLBMs and also by covert SS-16 mobile ICBMs as well, why do you estimate SS-24 replacement of SS-17s on a one-for-one basis? Why should the Soviets subject themselves to such a one-for-one trade? Why should they dismantle any SS-17s at all, when they are violating SALT II in 11 ways as confirmed by the President? For years intelligence officers argued over which of the 5th Generation ICBMs the Soviets would choose as the one new type ICBM allowed them under SALT II. Now we know they are developing and deploying at least three, and possibly four new type ICBMs.

Similarly, DIA states that "When [the SS-25] is [deployed], SS-11 missiles probably will be removed. We expect no increase in warheads due to the SS-25." This statement again erroneously assumes no covert MIRVing of the SS-25. But because you have no idea how many SS-25s are being produced, and, doubly, since you have no idea how many camouflaged and concealed SS-20 launchers will have SS-25 missiles available to be launched by them, how do you pretend to be able to check on how many SS-25 warheads will

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be deployed? Moreover, what about the possibility that SS-11s will be replaced by the overtly MIRVed SS-24s in SS-11 silos?

I believe that with the advent of mobile camouflaged and concealed Soviet strategic missiles, we will have no way of knowing how many Soviet ICBM warheads will be arrayed against us.

In sum, with a caveat that looks suspiciously like bureaucratic weasel wording, DIA states that "The Defense Intelligence Agency ... can confirm that the Soviets have about 6,300 warheads on deployed ICBM launchers." To the uninitiated, that statement implies that DIA knows how many ICBMs the Soviets have, and that the ones DIA counts as "deployed" are the only ones capable of being shot at the U.S. But neither of these propositions is true, as DIA should know. Why then does DIA hide U.S. uncertainties with terms of intelligence art (designed by bureaucratic weasel-worders) such as "deployed," which had very little meaning in the age of fixed ICBM launchers capable of rapid reload/refire, but which have no meaning whatsoever now that there is a new generation of camouflaged and concealed mobile missiles? Why does DIA continue to obfuscate the fact that it has no idea how many missiles the Soviets have produced or are stockpiled for reserve covert launch or rapid reload/refire?

Therefore DIA does not agree with your own judgement that there is a "range of uncertainty" concerning the number of Soviet ICBM launchers and warheads. I agree with you. Why does DIA deny this "range of uncertainty", which may be as great as 2,000 Soviet ICBM warheads, not counting refires?

I believe that this DIA failure to take seriously my repeated requests for an accurate accounting of the single most important measure of military power in the world today -- comparative ICBM warheads -- requires a special hearing of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee devoted to this subject alone. Accordingly, as the enclosed letter indicates, I am requesting such a hearing from Senator Stevens, and I am requesting that Senator Stevens ask you to make General Williams available for testimony.


I am also concerned about recent Defense Department statements about the comparative U.S. - Soviet strategic force levels to the effect that even though the Soviets are numerically superior in most measures, the U.S. can ostensibly rely on superior quality. A DOD spokesman was recently quoted as stating "we disagree" with the assessment that the Soviet Union has military supremacy. The

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versus quality. We don't feel that we're inferior to the Soviet military forces. Despite any advantages they may have numerically in some areas, we would still rather have what we've got." I would remind you that on May 3, 1983, JCS Chairman General Vessey testified to the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee that he would "trade" our ballistic missile force of ICBMs and SLBMs for the Soviets', because not only did the Soviets have more launchers and warheads but theirs had better accuracy and yields. Moreover, the FY 1986 Annual Report of the Defense Department states on pages 15 and 16 that the USSR not only has quantitative strategic superiority, but also that all but one qualitative measure is trending in the future to more Soviet qualitative superiority. I wish your Public Affairs officers would use your Annual Report to Congress for their press guidance.

Finally, my letter is meant in a spirit of constructive criticism in order to do our very best to support the strategic modernization program and defense budget.

Sincerely,



James A. McClure

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 17, 1985

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense
Senate Appropriations Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510


Dear Ted:

As you know, the comparative number of Soviet and U.S. warheads on InterContinental Ballistic Missiles is the most important single measure of military power in the world today. It has come to my attention that the Defense Intelligence Agency has different positions on the number of Soviet ICBM warheads, depending upon whether the estimate is public or classified. In addition, there are certain methodological and analytical problems in making such estimates. My enclosed letters to Defense Secretary Weinberger illustrate the problem.

Accordingly, I request a special open and then closed hearing as soon as possible on the DIA's estimates of Soviet ICBM warheads. I request that DIA Director General Williams be asked to testify on the divergencies in the DIA's estimates. In addition, I request that CIA Director Casey be asked to testify on this issue in both open and closed session.

There is a "range of uncertainty" in these estimates which has profound implications for Soviet SALT II compliance, SALT verifiability, MX, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and our strategic posture.

Sincerely,



James A. McClure
United States Senator



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29 APR 1985

Honorable James A. McClure
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator McClure:

Thank you for your letter of 3 April to Secretary Weinberger regarding Soviet ICBM warheads.

The rapid rise in the number of warheads in the Soviet ICBM force that started in the mid-1970s was due to the deployment of multiple-warhead SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs as replacements for earlier single-warhead missiles. The deployment of modernized versions of these missiles (also with multiple warheads), beginning about 1979, continued to increase the number of warheads. The completion of the initial phase of this modernization, in the 1984-1985 time period, accounts for the leveling off of the number of warheads depicted in the graph on page 30 of Soviet Military Power 1985.

However, the Soviets' ICBM modernization program has not stopped. The ten-warhead SS-X-24 is expected to be deployed in late 1985 or 1986 and will probably replace SS-17 ICBMs (which carry four warheads) on a one-for-one basis. Thus, the total number of deployed Soviet ICBM warheads may begin to rise as early as late this year. Hence, the level portion of the graph on page 30 depicts what we expect to be only a temporary effect as the Soviets prepare to deploy the SS-X-24. In discussing the overall modernization of the Soviet strategic missile force, it is therefore accurate to describe the number of warheads as rising.

The SS-X-25 is not yet operationally deployed; when it is, SS-11 missiles probably will be removed. As a result, we expect no increase in warheads due to SS-X-25 deployment. The graphic on page 41 of Soviet Military Power does not contradict the chart on page 30; on page 41, slanted lines are used to represent uncertainty regarding when each stage of a missile program began or will begin. As the graphic indicates, possible deployment of the SS-X-24 and SS-X-25 is in the 1985-1986 time period. Both classified and unclassified statements and data on Soviet ICBM warhead numbers, as reported by the intelligence community, are not contradictory. Throughout the document, as well as in public presentations, the Defense Intelligence Agency has reported and can confirm that the Soviets have a total of about 6,300 warheads on deployed ICBM launchers.

Thank you again for writing to the Secretary and for your continuing support of the President's strategic modernization program.

Sincerely,

JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

JAMES A. MCCLURE
IDAHO

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 15, 1985

The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
The Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20310

Dear Cap:

You have served American national security well by sending Congress the 29 declassified historical charts on comparative U.S. - Soviet armaments. My attached letters show you what I have done with them in order to bolster Congressional support for American defense modernization programs. I suggest that you include these 29 charts in the April 1985 edition of Soviet Military Power.

One of the 29 charts did not do what needs to be done in support of the MX. The most significant single measure of military power in the world today is comparative U.S. - Soviet nuclear warheads on Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles. ICBM warheads are able to destroy hardened military targets quickly, and thus can threaten all military forces. What the Congress urgently needs to support the strategic modernization programs and the MX is a realistic comparison of ICBM warheads.

On page 26 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Posture Statement for FY 1986, there is an indication that each of the 308 Soviet super-heavy SS-18 ICBMs is capable of carrying 14 warheads. There have also been several recent press reports that the Defense Department has estimated that the Soviets now have about 8,500 ICBM warheads, largely because each SS-18 can carry 14 warheads. Moreover, I have in my possession five reports classified Secret from the Defense Intelligence Agency, OSD/Net Assessment, OSD/Program Analysis and Evaluation, and the Defense Department, each of which indicate Soviet ICBM warhead levels above 8,000. These reports are consistent with the several recent press reports that the DOD estimate Soviet ICBM warhead force level of 8,500. We should not continue to mislead ourselves, the Congress, and the American people on this important issue.


The Honorable Caspar Weinberger
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I therefore request that the DOD prepare immediately a realistic unclassified chart of estimated U.S. and Soviet ICBM warheads, which would assume 14 warheads on each SS-18. This chart is so important to MX and to the defense budget debate that I am going to request a special hearing on it in the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

Such a chart would be reasonable and realistic, because a truly worst case estimate might assume 30 warheads on each SS-18 (See the New York Times magazine January 27, 1985 article by Democrats Brzezinski and Kampelman), SS-17 and SS-18 rapid reload and refire capabilities, and thousands of stockpiled missiles for covert soft launch. I believe that the 1978 - 1981 SALT II debate is replete with open source references which could make such a chart both totally protective of intelligence sources and methods and completely realistic.

With warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,



James A. McClure
United States Senator



Steve Symms
United States Senator